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UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
depend upon consideration of many circumstances for their determination.
Until a pattern of circumstances sufficient to constitute "accusation"
emerges from future United States Supreme Court decisions, it will be
difficult to predict with any certainty when investigation has shaded into
accusation in any particular case.
MICHAEL J. CAPPUCIO
WHITHER NONSUIT?
The plaintiff moved for nonsuit immediately after the jury had been
impaneled and sworn. The defendant then moved for a judgment with
prejudice against the plaintiff on the ground that the Florida Rules of
Civil Procedure provide only for voluntary dismissal of actions, with no
provision for nonsuits. The trial court denied the defendant's motion
and allowed the plaintiff to take a nonsuit, assessing costs against the
plaintiff. The First District Court of Appeal reversed, holding that
Florida Rule 1.35(a), as revised in 1962, supersedes Florida's nonsuit
statute,' insofar as the statute permits the taking of a voluntary nonsuit
in any manner inconsistent with the Rule. The Supreme Court granted
certiorari and affirmed the decision of the District Court of Appeal.
Crews v. Dobson, 177 So.2d 202 (Fla. 1965).
In the instant case the Florida Supreme Court attempted to deal the
death blow to the common law concept of nonsuit in this state. This was
done on the federal level in 1938, with the promulgation of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.2 In Florida, however, despite the similarity
of Florida Rule 1.35 to Federal Rule 41,8 the right of the plaintiff to take
a nonsuit until "the Jury retire from the bar,"4 has been zealously pro-
tected. The decision of the supreme court to treat with finality the long-
standing problem of "Florida's unique dismissal"5 calls for a review of
the history and significance of the problem.
Under the common law, as modified by the statute of 2 Hen. IV. c. 7,
a plaintiff had an absolute right to terminate his litigation at any stage of
the proceedings before the verdict was read.' In 1913, the United States
1. FLA. STAT. § 54.09 (1963): "No plaintiff shall take a non-suit on trial unless he do
so before the Jury retire from the bar."
2. FED. R. Civ. P. 41 provides for the voluntary dismissal of actions under specified
circumstances and conditions. On the federal level there is no absolute right of dismissal
after service by an adverse party of an answer or of a motion for summary judgment.
3. For a detailed comparison of the effect of the two rules, see Barns and Mattis, 1962
Amendments to the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, 17 U. Mmmi L. REv. 276, 281-87
(1963).
4. FLA. STAT. § 54.09 (1963).
5. Comment, Florida's Unique Dismissal-The Non-suit, 13 U. FLA. L. REv. 105 (1960)
provides an excellent summary of the development and effect of nonsuit in Florida. [Here-
inafter cited as 13 U. FLA. L. REV.)
6. National Broadway Bank v. Lesley, 31 Fla. 56, 12 So. 525 (1893).
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Supreme Court discussed the common law nonsuit' and said it was a
dismissal of a plaintiff's action without prejudice, upon the payment of
costs.
It was felt by some that the absolute right of nonsuit was unjustly
advantageous to the plaintiff at the expense of the defendant, who might
be put to excessive expenditure of time and money to defend a suit only
to have it dropped at the last moment on a whim of the plaintiff, who
might later decide to put the defendant through the same costly process
again.8 Because of this possible injustice, the majority of American
jurisdictions have limited the right of nonsuit, at least to specified stages
of the proceedings. There has been, however, a general reluctance to
abandon entirely the concept, possibly because of a deep seated belief
in the principle of the common law never to compel parties to maintain
civil actions.
The Florida statute, section 54.09, by providing that no plaintiff
shall take a nonsuit unless he does so before the jury retires from the
bar, implies and has been interpreted to mean that the common law non-
suit does exist in Florida,x° limited by the requirement that it be taken
before the jury retires. To limit further the use of nonsuit, the Florida
courts have developed the involuntary nonsuit," unknown under the com-
mon law. A nonsuit taken by a plaintiff in the face of an impending
adverse ruling of the court which would preclude him from recovery under
any circumstances on that cause of action is characterized as an involun-
tary nonsuit. Unlike the voluntary nonsuit, it is a judgment on the merits
and accordingly precludes further litigation of the same lawsuit.'"
In the light of developed statutory and case law limiting the once
absolute right of nonsuit, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as
7. Slocum v. New York Life Ins. Co., 228 U.S. 364, 392 (1913).
A nonsuit at common law was a dismissal of the plaintiff's action without an
adjudication, other than the imposition of costs, and constituted no bar to another
action for the same cause. Originally granted where the plaintiff made default when
his presence was required, or otherwise failed to proceed in due course, it came to
be applied on the trial when, although actually present, he chose, in view of the
state of his evidence, not to risk an adverse verdict. But unless he assented to being
nonsuited on the evidence it was essential that a verdict be taken, even although it
was certain to be against him. In other words, such a nonsuit was always voluntary,
and never compulsory.
8. "The courts have recognized the tremendous advantages allowed the plaintiff by his
right to non-suit and have constantly been in the process of qualifying and restricting the
use of this concept .... ." 13 U. FLA. L. REV. at 122.
9. Typical statutory provisions permit voluntary discontinuance before trial, Denver
& R.G.R.R. Co. v. Paonia Ditch Co., 49 Colo. 281, 112 Pac. 692 (1910); before the
defendant begins the presentation of his defense, Consumers' Power Co. v. McNichol, 287
Fed. 529 (6th Cir. 1923); before argument on the facts has begun, Gildea v. Lund, 131 Md.
385, 102 Atl. 467 (1917); and before submission of the cases to the jury, St. Louis, I.M. &
S.R.R. Co. v. Ingram, 118 Ark. 377, 176 S.W. 692 (1915).
10. J. Schnarr & Co. v. Virginia-Carolina Chem. Corp., 118 Fla. 258, 159 So. 39 (1934).
11. Id. at 42.
12. Id: at 43.
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adopted, severely limited the common law nonsuit. The federal rule, 41,
has been held to have completely abolished nonsuit at the federal level."3
The plaintiff's absolute right of dismissal, except by stipulation of all the
parties, is sharply limited to the period before service by the adverse party
of an answer or of a motion for summary judgment. 4 Nor may a plaintiff
dismiss the same action more than once without prejudice. 5 After such
a motion or answer the plaintiff can only dismiss his action upon stipula-
tion of all the parties," or by "order of the court and upon such terms and
conditions as the court deems proper.""
There is some disagreement in the federal courts as to whether the
plaintiff has an absolute right to take a voluntary dismissal without
prejudice upon terms and conditions set by the court, 8 or whether the
court may refuse to allow such dismissal by refusing to set such terms
and conditions," as held by a large majority of jurisdictions. Therefore,
in the majority of the federal courts, after the service by the adverse
party of an answer or of a motion to dismiss and in the absence of a
stipulation by all the parties, the plaintiff's power to voluntarily dismiss
his action is totally discretionary with the trial judge.
When the 1954 Florida Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted, those
sections of Rule 1.35 applying to voluntary dismissal by the plaintiff were
virtually identical to the comparable sections of Federal Rule 41, indicat-
ing that Florida apparently intended to supersede its own statutory non-
suit. But the Florida rulemakers added a clause not included in the
Federal Rule. Appended to Rule 1.35(2) (b) was the statement, "how-
ever ... nothing stated herein shall preclude a nonsuit from being taken
pursuant to any applicable statute." These words, whose original purpose
no one seems able to fathom, have caused much confusion. The only
applicable statute is section 54.09.2" It was generally considered that
the questioned clause, although added to the section of the rule dealing
with involuntary dismissals, did in fact preserve intact Florida's statutory
nonsuit.' This, of course, was inconsistent with the clear intent of Rule
13. Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Reeves, 148 F.2d 731 (8th Cir. 1945).
14. FED. R. CIv. P. 41(a) (1) (i).
15. FED. R. Civ. P. 41(a) (1) (ii).
16. Ibid.
17. FED. R. Civ. P. 41(a) (2).
18. Bolten v. General Motors Co., 180 F.2d 379 (7th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S.
813 (1950).
19. Willard Dairy Corp. v. National Dairy Prod. Corp., 309 F.2d 943 (6th Cir. 1962),
cert. denied, 373 U.S. 934 (1963) ; Ockert v. Union Barge Line Corp., 190 F.2d 303 (3d Cir.
1951) ; Larsen v. Switzer, 183 F.2d 850 (8th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 911 (1951).
20. Sections 59.05 and 59.07(3) apply only to appellate review of nonsuits.
21. Author's Comment, FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.35, 30 FLa. STAT. ANN (1956), "Nonsuits are
not superseded"; Arnow and Brown, Florida's 1954 Rules of Civil Procedure, 7 U. FA. L.
RaV. 125, 137 (1954), "The statutory provision found in Section 54.09, Florida Statutes 1953,
concerning nonsuits heretofore applicable at law still remains, of course, and will presumably
have application in law cases."
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1.35 (a) to limit the use of voluntary dismissal, but a prevalent reluctance
to relinquish the established practice of nonsuit carried the day.
In 1962, however, the Florida rules were amended, and the clause
concerning nonsuits was omitted. No explanation for the omission was
provided, and the courts were presented with the problem of whether the
omission of the reference to nonsuit was intended to put an end to the
statutory nonsuit. Because the rules supersede all conflicting statutes,22
there can be no nonsuit if section 54.09 conflicts with Rule 1.35. Plaintiffs,
however, have continued to take nonsuits, and the district courts have
not agreed in their treatment of the problem.28
Now that the Florida Supreme Court has taken a stand and declared
that the Florida Rules, as amended, eliminate the statutory nonsuit,
our courts are left in the same position as the federal courts. But, there
is still a decision to be made. Will Florida courts hold that a plaintiff has
an absolute right to a voluntary dismissal upon terms and conditions set
by the court subsequent to answer or motion for summary judgment,24
or will they, like the minority of federal courts, hold that the plaintiff's
power to take a voluntary dismissal rests within the sound discretion of
the court, which can, if it thinks justice will best be served, refuse to
allow the dismissal by refusing to set terms and conditions? If the latter
view prevails, then Florida plaintiffs will have no absolute right to dis-
missal without prejudice after answer or motion for summary judgment,2
save by stipulation of all the parties.
When Crews v. Dobson was handed down, it could be questioned
22. In re Fla. Rules of Civil Procedure, 1962 Revision, 142 So.2d 725 (Fla. 1962), "This
compilation and revision shall supersede all conflicting rules and statutes."
23. The First District has firmly taken the stand that under the current rule plaintiffs
have no right to nonsuit. Dobson v. Crews, 164 So.2d 252 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964), aff'd, 177
So.2d 202 (Fla. 1965).
The Second District, in Cook v. Lichtblau, 176 So.2d 523, 533 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965), said,
"We . . . hold that under Florida R.C.P. 1.35, [sic] as amended, a plaintiff may not termi-
nate an action as a matter of right by taking a nonsuit whether voluntary or involuntary
under prior Florida practice." However, it will be noted that prior to May 28, 1965, the
Second District Court of Appeal did not take a definite position, but rather chose, when the
problem was before it, to decide the case on an unrelated issue. State ex rel. Paluska v.
White, 162 So.2d 697 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964) ; Thoman v. Ashley, 164 So.2d 252 (Fla. 2d Dist.
1964). In the Thoman case, the dissent argued that the court should hear the case on the
merits and consider whether nonsuits had been abolished. The dissent did consider the
problem and argued that voluntary nonsuits were not abolished by the rules, as amended.
The Third District Court of Appeal gave at least tacit recognition to nonsuits in
Ramsey v. Aronson, 99 So.2d 643 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1958). That case, however, was decided
before the 1962 revision of the rules.
24. When the 1965 revisions to the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, In re Fla. Rules
of Civil Procedure, 1965 Revision, 178 So.2d 15 (Fla. 1965), become effective, the question
will be whether a plaintiff has an absolute right to a voluntary dismissal on terms and
conditions set by the court after a hearing on a motion for summary judgment, or in the
event he has already dismissed an action on the same cause once before.
25. Under the 1965 revisions, supra note 24, there would be no absolute right to
dismissal without prejudice after a hearing on a motion for summary judgment, save by
stipulation of all the parties.
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whether this was a satisfactory resolution of the nonsuit controversy.
Certainly it was a radical change from the common law position. In-
novation was originally sought in the concept because of a feeling
that the absolute right of nonsuit provided the plaintiff with an undue
advantage in all cases at law. With Crews the pendulum may have swung
too far to the other side. A situation may arise in which the court may be
ready to direct a verdict for the defendant, because the plaintiff has failed
to prove some element of his case. If the plaintiff is reasonably certain
he can supply the missing element, he will wish to dismiss his action and
bring it again when his evidence is complete. One can easily imagine other
situations in which a plaintiff could justifiably wish to temporarily
terminate his action.26 Under the prevailing federal view, if the court
believes the move would be unduly prejudicial to the defendant, the
plaintiff must stand by helplessly and see his case lost. His only recourse
is to convince a court of review that there was an abuse of discretion in
the lower court. There has been some indication that at least one Florida
district believes that the court does have discretion in deciding whether to
set terms and conditions after the plaintiff has lost his absolute right
of dismissal under the rule.
Although this may at times seem to tip the balance too far toward
the defendant, there is a compensating consideration. In some cases a
plaintiff will wish to dismiss his action after the litigation has proceeded
to a point where the defendant has expended such efforts in the defense
of the case that he cannot be adequately protected by any terms and
conditions which the trial court may impose upon the plaintiff as a
prerequisite to granting the voluntary dismissal of the action without
prejudice. Allowing the court discretion to refuse to set terms and condi-
tions provides a remedy for thig eventuality. Clearly there is a dilemma,
which explains the disagreement at the federal level, and pinpoints at
least one of the problems which Crews v. Dobson has dropped into the
laps of our district courts.
A second major problem arising from this decision is the Supreme
Court's evident lack of consideration for the plight of all the plaintiffs
who have taken nonsuits since the 1962 amendments to the rules. These
plaintiffs in good faith dismissed their actions in the reasonable belief that
26. For a discussion of situations in which a plaintiff might reasonably wish to
temporarily terminate his action, see Note, Exercise of Discretion in Permitting Dismissals
Without Prejudice Under Federal Rule 41(a), 54 COLtUM. L. REV. 616-25 (1954).
27. In Cook v. Lichtblau, 176 So.2d 523 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965), the court spoke favorably
of the disfavor with which the federal courts treat motions for voluntary dismissal without
prejudice after the plaintiff has rested or the defendant has moved for a directed verdict.
Although recognizing that the judge does have discretion to dismiss after such time, the
court said that a strong showing is necessary to warrant the entry of a dismissal without
prejudice at that late stage. As authorities for its statement of the federal position, the
court cited 2 BARRON & HoLTzoFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 912 at notes 44.1,
45; and 5 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE, 41.05[11 at notes 27, 28.
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they had an absolute right to bring the action again at a later date. All
of these plaintiffs may now be foreclosed and barred.
All three districts have heard cases concerning the problem, and once
again, there is a split. The Second District, in Cook v. Lichtblau, where
the plaintiff had taken a nonsuit after the court had indicated an intention
to grant the defendants' motion for a directed verdict, said:
In view of all the circumstances of this case we conclude that a
mistrial should be declared. The basis for a mistrial is found in
the action of the trial court dismissing the jury. By dismissing
the jury before he exercised his discretion upon what, in legal
effect, constituted a motion for dismissal without prejudice, the
trial judge effectively foreclosed any possibility of exercising
his discretion against granting that motion. By the same action
he precluded the possibility of denying the defendant's motion
for a directed verdict, upon which he did not expressly reserve
a ruling. Under the circumstances we think the trial court should
preserve the pending action by declaring a mistrial."
However, both the First and Third Districts have sent such actions back
to the trial courts for a dismissal of the action with prejudice. In Dade
County v. Peachey, the Third District Court reasoned:
We find that we are not at liberty to adopt the course suggested
by the appellee and indicated by Cook v. Lichtblau, . . . be-
cause in the instant case the jury had retired from the bar and
no possible ground for a dismissal without prejudice was given
by the plaintiff at the time he moved for a nonsuit. . . . The
plaintiff-appellee's insistence upon his right to a nonsuit, which
must now be considered a motion for dismissal without prej-
udice, must be considered as a failure to prosecute and dismissal
with prejudice must follow.29
And the First District, in a per curiam opinion, St. Johns River Terminal
Co. v. Pickett, ° cited Crews v. Dobson, and held that the judgment entered
on plaintiff's nonsuit should be vacated, and a judgment entered on the
motion of the defendant dismissing the action with prejudice and at the
cost of the plaintiff. The First District, of course, had already taken a
stand on this question. That court, in Dobson v. Crews,"' held that when
the plaintiff had sought to dismiss his action without using the procedure
provided by 1.35(a), the trial court erred in overruling the defendant's
motion for a judgment on the merits, under the provisions of 1.35(b),
for failure of the plaintiff to prosecute the action. 2 In a later case, the
28. Cook v. Lichtblau, 176 So.2d 523, 535 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
29. Case No. 65-152, Fla. 3d Dist., Sept. 28, 1965 (unreported).
30. 178 So.2d 215 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965).
31. 164 So.2d 252 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964), aff'd, 177 So.2d 202 (Fla. 1965).
32. Under Rule 1.35(b) it is not required that an involuntary dismissal for failure to
prosecute be a dismissal with prejudice. For a discussion of this aspect of the rule, see
Massey and Westen, Civil Procedure, 18 U. MTa.i L. REV. 745, 776 (1964).
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Dobson court held that when a defendant had allowed the plaintiff to
take a nonsuit without objecting, or moving the court for an order dis-
missing the action with prejudice, or appealing the judgment of voluntary
nonsuit, the defendant had waived his rights and was estopped to assert
the error of the trial court in granting the nonsuit, or to insist that the
order of nonsuit be construed as a dismissal of the action on the merits,
which would preclude the maintenance of a later action under the doctrine
of res judicata a It seems reasonable to assume then, that at least in those
cases where the defendants did object to the nonsuit and did move to dis-
miss the plaintiff's action with prejudice under 1.35(b), the plaintiffs are
now in danger of having a court hold that by taking a nonsuit they have
submitted their action to what will now be construed as a judgment on
the merits and a bar to further litigation. It is submitted that this is unjust.
Much confusion was manifested among the bench and bar as to the status
of nonsuit in this state. Plaintiffs should not be penalized because they,
in effect, aligned themselves with the losing side in the controversy. 4
The Dobson v. Crews court could have returned the case to the trial court
with instructions to treat the plaintiff's request for nonsuit as a motion
for voluntary dismissal without prejudice under 1.3 5 (a) and to set terms
and conditions of dismissal accordingly.85 If the courts hold that nonsuits
taken after the 1962 amendment, at least in those cases in which the
defendant objected to the nonsuit, are judgments on the merits, then
then Supreme Court in Crews v. Dobson has for all practical purposes
handed down a retroactive ruling of serious and injurious consequences
to a large number of plaintiffs. It is submitted that the court should have
ruled that from the date of its decision there will be no nonsuits in this
state, and returned the case before it to the lower court for treatment of
plaintiff's nonsuit as a motion for voluntary dismissal without prejudice.
The third, and most perplexing problem raised by Crews v. Dobson,
is the effect of the 1965 revisions of the Florida Rules8" on the nonsuit
chimera. In the Crews decision, the Court said:
Our first thought was that since this court is considering now the
question whether or not a further rule should be adopted to
clarify the procedure in this respect, we should not in this case
anticipate the court's action as a rule-making body; our second
33. Florida East Coast Ry. Co. v. Lewis, 167 So.2d 104 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964). The
court reasoned that by failing to take such action the defendant had deprived the plaintiff of
the privilege of deciding whether to proceed with the trial rather than submit to an in-
voluntary nonsuit.
34. Since 1962, plaintiffs' counsel could have protected their clients' interests by asking
the court to issue an order of nonsuit and an order of voluntary dismissal. But counsel could
not be expected to foresee that such action would be necessary.
35. The court in Cook v. Lichtblau, 176 So.2d 523 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965) considered this
solution, but rejected it because of the possibility of the plaintiff in that action being barred
by the statute of limitations.
36. Supra note 24. The opinion states that the new amendments will take effect
January 1, 1966.
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and abiding thought is that we would do a service to the Bench
and Bar by settling the matter in the present litigation.37
Twenty-one days later, the Court handed down an opinion revising some
of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, including Rule 1.35,3" effective
January 1, 1966. Substantial changes were made, and while a full dis-
cussion of the text of the new rule is beyond the scope of this paper,
it will be well to briefly consider certain aspects of the rule which were
seemingly changed to mitigate the effect of the Crews decision.
The current Rule 1.35(a) states:
[A]n action may be dismissed by the plaintiff without order of
court (i) by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before ser-
vice by the adverse party of an answer or of a motion for sum-
mary judgment or decree, which ever first occurs, or (ii) by
filing stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who have ap-
peared in the action .... Unless otherwise stated in the notice of
dismissal or stipulation, the dismissal is without prejudice, ex-
cept that a notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication upon
the merits when filed by a plaintiff who has once dismissed in
any court of this state an action based on or including the same
claim.
The new Rule 1.35 (a) states:
[A] n action may be dismissed by plaintiff without order of court
(i) by serving a notice of dismissal at any time before a hearing
on motion for summary judgment, or if none is served, or if
such motion is denied, before retirement of the jury in a case
tried before a jury or before submission of a nonjury case to the
court for decision, or (ii) by filing a stipulation of dismissal
signed by all parties who have appeared in the action. Unless
otherwise stated in the notice or stipulation, the dismissal is
without prejudice, except that a notice of dismissal operates as
an adjudication upon the merits when served by a plaintiff who
has once dismissed in any court an action based on or including
the same claim. (Emphasis added.)
It would seem that the reluctance of Florida attorneys to relinquish
the concept of nonsuit has manifested itself rather forcefully.
It is suggested that this revision of Rule 1.35 restores the nonsuit to
Florida practice, Crews v. Dobson notwithstanding. However, nonsuits
have not emerged unscathed; they are now to be called voluntary dis-
missals, and in some respects they are more severely limited than before.
Once again, a Florida plaintiff can dismiss his action without prejudice
after an answer has been filed, but not after a hearing on a motion for
37. Crews v. Dobson, 177 So.2d 202, 204 (Fla. 1965).
38. Supra note 24 at 25.
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summary judgment, unless such motion is denied, in which case he can
dismiss up until the time the jury retires from the bar or the case is sub-
mitted to the judge for decision. A further limitation is the stipulation
that a plaintiff may avail himself of this voluntary dismissal without
prejudice only one time with any one lawsuit. Neither may he dismiss
his action over the defendant's objections after a counterclaim has been
filed upon him, unless the counterclaim can remain pending for inde-
pendent adjudication by the court." These are significant limitations
upon the once absolute right of nonsuit, but the revised rule does mitigate
the holding of Crews v. Dobson.
That decision, however, is still of significance to those plaintiffs who
have and will have dismissed their actions while the present Rule 1.35 is
in effect, and who may come under its retroactive effect. It is also rea-
sonable to assume that in the absence of a motion for summary judgment
or upon the denial of such motion, or if a plaintiff has once before dis-
missed his action or a defendant has objected because his counterclaim
cannot remain pending, in such cases the courts will hold, following Crews,
that voluntary dismissals may be had only upon order of the court and
upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper. This of course
raises the problem of whether the right to have such terms and condi-
tions set is absolute. Crews v. Dobson has effectively abolished statutory
nonsuit in Florida, and the new Florida Rule, 1.35, will create a voluntary
dismissal similar to the old nonsuit, but more limited in scope with respect
to actions at law tried by a jury.
There is a further consideration, however. The Florida Supreme
Court, by the 1965 revision of Rule 1.35, has actually accomplished a
broad extension of the concept of nonsuit, contrary to what has hereto-
fore been a steady trend toward limiting the concept.40 The new rule
specifies that the absolute right to voluntary dismissal, in the absence of
a summary judgment, prior voluntary dismissal, or counterclaim, exists,
"before retirement of the jury in a case tried before a jury or before sub-
mission of a nonjury case to the court for decision . . . ." (Emphasis
added.) This not only restores the absolute right of dismissal to jury trials,
as was the old nonsuit practice, but it appears to extend the practice so
that it is available in actions at law without a jury,41 and further still to
suits in equity, where it has never existed before. 2
39. 1965 revision of 1.35(a) (2).
40. "The courts have recognized the tremendous advantages allowed the plaintiff by
his right to non-suit and have constantly been in the process of qualifying and restricting the
use of this concept . . ." 13 U. FLA. L. REV. at 122.
41. 13 U. FLA. L. REV. at 108-11 provides a consideration of Florida cases which
substantiate the view that FLA. STAT. § 54.09, by its reference to a jury, limits nonsuit, by
implication, to law actions with a jury, and precludes its use in suits in equity.
42. KOOMAN, FLORIDA CHANCERY PLEADING AND PRACTICE § 163 (1939), discusses the
discretion of the court in considering the motion of a plaintiff in equity to dismiss his
action without prejudice.
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It is difficult to understand why the Florida Supreme Court handed
down a decision abolishing nonsuit in this state and then only twenty-one
days later so drastically revised the rules of civil procedure that Florida
now seems to be pioneering in the extension of the practice of nonsuit.
CHARLENE HERMANN
SEQUESTRATION OF WITNESSES-SHOULD IT BE
GRANTED AS A MATTER OF RIGHT?
The defendant was convicted of robbery and assault with intent to
commit murder. At the trial a detective, who was a spectator, heard the
defendant testify that he had not made an oral confession. After hearing
this, the detective advised the prosecutor that the defendant had in fact
made an oral confession to him. Over defense counsel's objection, the
detective was allowed to testify as to the confession. The defendant col-
laterally attacked the judgment' and moved for a new trial.' Upon the
trial court's denial of his motion, the defendant appealed. On appeal,
held, reversed and remanded for a new trial: allowing a witness to testify
after hearing the defendant's testimony was in violation of the rule
requiring sequestration of witnesses and was an abuse of judicial dis-
cretion. Jackson v. State, 177 So.2d 353 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
Since the Biblical story of Susanna's exoneration, 8 the separation of
witnesses has been regarded as a valuable adjunct to direct and cross
examination of witnesses.' The early English doctrine indicated that
sequestration" is entirely discretionary with the court,6 and with the
1. FLA. R. CRim. P. 1, provides that a prisoner under sentence of a court may col-
laterally attack the court's judgment on the basis that his Constitutional rights were violated.
2. See Jackson v. State, 166 So.2d 194 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
3. Two elders coveted Susanna, a very fair woman and pure, the wife of Joadm;
they tempted her, but she resisted; then they plotted, and charged her with adultery;
and she was brought before the assembly; and the elders said: As we walked in the
garden alone ... a young man ... came unto her, and lay with her. . .. [T]hese
things do we testify. Then the assembly believed them, as those that were the elders
and judges of the people .. .But Daniel, standing in the midst of them said: "Are
ye such fools, ye sons of Israel, that without examination or knowledge of the
truth ye have condemned a daughter of Israel?" [Tihen Daniel said unto them,
"Put these two aside, one far from another, and I will examine them." So when they
were put asunder one from another, he called one of them and said unto him, ...
"now then, if thou hast seen her, tell me under what tree sawest thou them
company together?" who answered, "under a mastick tree. . . " So, he put him
aside and commanded to bring the other, and said unto him . . . . "Now therefore
tell me, under what tree didst thou take them company together?" who answered,
"under an holm tree . . . ." And they arose against the two elders, for Daniel had
convicted them of false witness, by their own mouth. As quoted in 6 WiGWon,
EVIDENCE § 1837 (3d ed. 1940).
4. Braddon, Observations on the Earl of Essex's Murder, 9 How. St. Tr. 1224 (1725);
Cook's Trial, 13 How. St. Tr. 311 (1696); Rosewell's Trial, 10 How. St. Tr. 147 (1684); Sir
Walter Raleigh's Trial, 1 Jardine Crim. Tr. (1603).
5. "Sequestration" is defined as, "the separating or setting aside of a thing in contro-
versy, from the possession of both parties that contend for it." BLAcx, LAW DicTIONARY
1531 (4th ed. 1951).
6. Cook's Trial, supra note 4 at 348. ("It is not necessary to be granted for the ask-
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